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The standardized technology seems to increase efficiency and reduce costs associated with wide variety of product and 
services in the field of information and communication. The idea of standard-essential patents (SEPs) is now getting more 
attention in patent litigations in different economies due to requirement of its licensing on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The telecommunications industry has recently seen a significant increase in costly patent 
litigations. This smartphone patent war needs amicable resolution amongst different stakeholder. The scope of the present paper 
includes examination of the concept of SEPs and comparison of the various modes of ensuring their availability on FRAND 
terms. The position of law in different jurisdictions is presented keeping in mind the interest of all stakeholders and the recent 
judicial trends in India. Authors have followed an evaluative method in which case law forms the basis of discussion. The paper 
argues that the existing legal framework in India on the grant of injunctions and the licensing of SEPs on strictly FRAND terms 
appears to be adequate, however, the recent trend of litigation seems conflicting as one party wishes to enforce FRAND term 
and opposite party is arguing that the terms are anti-competitive. 
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In knowledge-based economy, the way we create and 
access knowledge play crucial role. Consumer 
products in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) sector, manufactured by different 
companies incorporate specific technology standards, 
which plays important role where the need for 
interoperability is essential to promote innovation and 
competition.1 Such standardized technologies enable 
gadgets to communicate with each other and 
frequently give rise to substantial consumer benefits.2 
It also ensures performances of devices with greater 
efficiency besides associated risks of being misused. 
These standards are important in many areas of 
economic life and generally increase efficiency and 
reduce costs associated with wide variety of product 
and services in the field of information and 
communication.3 
Joaquín Almunia recognised that standards-setting 
plays a crucial role in promoting ‘interoperability’4 in 
relation to such information and communication 
technologies.5 Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) 
protect such technological standards and what 
constitutes a SEP is normally determined by the 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) that develop 
the standard.1 In order to balance bargaining power, 
SSOs across all jurisdictions obligate SEP holders to 
license their exclusive rights available in the name of 
patents on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms. SSOs can be governmental, quasi-
governmental or private.6 
It is difficult to manufacture standard compliant 
products, such as smart phones, tablets, dongles, etc. 
without using technologies covered by one or more 
SEPs.2 It is a patent that claims an invention must be 
used to comply with standard.  
 
 
Here, difficulty lies in the fact that each SSO has 
its own definition of a SEP, which broadly covers any 
patent under which a licence is necessary in order to 
implement the standard.1  
 
After adoption of SEPs by SSOs its implementation 
is necessary to comply with a standard, which needs 
significant costs to manufacture standard compliant 
products, these patents confer increased market power 
to their holders, as switching to alternative technologies 
may not be possible. The possibility by owners of SEPs 
to seek and obtain injunctions against infringers of their 
SEPs is generally limited due to concerns about 
potential hold-up by patent holders.7 The present 
————— 
†Corresponding author: Email: digvijaysinghlaw@gmail.com 
J INTELLEC PROP RIGHTS, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2019 
 
 
150
debate about standards concerns the ability of holders 
of SEPs to enforce and protect their rights by seeking 
injunctive relief. Not being able to use SEPs results in 
incompatible products that are almost certain not to be 
interoperable with other products governed by the 
standard. SEPs are thus, particularly important in 
industries where interoperability is key and where all or 
nearly all devices implement SEPs, for instance in the 
telecommunications sector. In such situations, a 
balance is needed between maintaining free 
competition on the one hand and safeguarding 
exclusive rights of the patent holders on the other 
hand.8 Such, balance is now effectively maintained by 
the different courts in various jurisdiction to great 
extent.9 
Although, telecommunication networks are 
growing in India rapidly, but Indian Patent Law does 
not contain any special provision for SEPs. On the 
other hand, concept of SEPs is now getting more 
attention in various patent litigations in India due to 
requirement of its licencing on FRAND terms. It is 
argued that Indian jurisprudence on fair, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and licensing 
practices for SEPs are at a nascent stage.10 Recently, 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of 
India, prepared a discussion paper on SEPs and its 
availability on FRAND terms and invited comments 
from various stakeholders to develop a suitable policy 
framework to define the obligations of holders of 
essential patents and their licensees.11 It appears that 
the move of the government is a result of recent 
litigations and trends, the decision of Delhi High 
Court and Competition Commission of India (CCI) 
may have prompted the government. The present 
paper explores the issue of injunctive relief and the 
role of the Indian Courts in setting FRAND royalty 
rates. The following part conceptualizes standard 
essential patents. 
 
Conceptualizing Standard-Essential Patents 
A patent covering technologies which are 
necessary to comply with the standards is called 
standard-essential patent (SEP).12 According to Carl 
Shapiro, standard essential patent is a patent that 
claims an invention, which must be used to comply 
with a standard.13 Thus, standards make reference to 
technologies that are protected by grant of patents.14 
In Microsoft Corp. v Motorola Mobility, Inc.15 
Washington District Court defines SEP as a given 
patent essential to a standard if use of the standard 
requires infringement of the patents, even if 
acceptable alternatives of that patent could have been 
written into the standard. A patent is also essential if 
the patent only reads onto an optional portion of the 
standard. Thus, it is impossible to manufacture 
standard-compliant products without using 
technologies covered by one or more SEPs. Patents 
and standards serve common objectives, in so far as 
they both encourage innovation as well as the 
diffusion of technology. Standards organizations, 
therefore, often require members to disclose and grant 
licenses to their patents and pending patent 
applications that cover a standard that the 
organization is developing. If a standard organization 
fails to get licenses for all patents that are essential to 
comply with a standard, owners of the unlicensed 
patents may demand or sue for royalties from 
companies that adopt the standard.16 
 
International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) defines a formal standard as a document, 
established by consensus that provides rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for activities or their 
results. A standard therefore, is generally a set of 
technical specifications that describes features of a 
product, process, service, interface or material. A 
standard may also describe how properties are 
measured, the composition of a chemical, the 
properties of an interface, or performance criteria 
against which a product or process can be measured.17 
Owners of patents essential to using the standard-
essential patents may opportunistically target non-
licensed implementers with patent infringement suits 
and reinforce their royalty demands with injunctions 
that would expel the implementers’ devices from the 
marketplace if they fail to comply.18 
 
SEPs are different from patents that are not essential 
to a standard, such as design patents, which protect the 
design features of an invention. This is because 
companies can invent alternative solutions that do not 
infringe a non-SEP.19 The telecommunications industry 
has recently seen a significant increase in costly patent 
litigations which some commentators have called 
“Smartphone Patent Wars”.20 In the Samsung21 and 
Motorola22 cases, the Commission clarifies that in the 
standardization context, where the SEPs holders have 
committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms, it is 
anti-competitive to seek to exclude competitors from the 
market by seeking injunctions on the basis of SEPs if the 
licensee is willing to take a license on FRAND terms. In 
these circumstances, the seeking of injunctions can 
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distort licensing negotiations and lead to unfair licensing 
terms, with a negative impact on consumer choice and 
prices.2 
 
Standard Essential Patents and FRAND Terms 
The precedent set by the two anti-trust decisions in 
the Samsung21 and Motorola22 cases provides a path to 
‘patent peace’ in the telecommunications industry. 
These two cases bring legal certainty in all industries 
where standards and FRAND encumbered SEPs play 
vital role. Most of the policies adopted by SSOs 
provided a framework for the development and 
implementation of many ICT standards.2 The large 
number of SEPs reflects the technological complexity 
of ICT standards, and also the companies’ attempts to 
systematically file patents in order to license them or 
obtain freedom to operate through cross-licensing 
agreements. The growing number of SEPs reflects the 
need to continually improve and replace standards in 
order to keep up with the pace of technological 
improvements. The pattern has changed radically over 
the last decade with the entry of new actors and more 
vertical specialization on both sides of the market for 
SEPs licenses. The presence of more SEP holders and 
implementers resulted in large number of licensing 
contracts per standard. The variety of licensing 
practices has also increased, due in particular to 
discrepancies between the patent positions of 
companies and their respective weights in downstream 
markets.23 
These licensing practices includes bilateral 
licensing24, and cross-licensing.25 In recent years, 
patent-rich incumbent companies facing the loss of 
market share have also started seeking quicker 
monetization of their patents by selling part of their 
portfolios to third parties. These developments show 
that patents in general, and SEPs in particular, are now 
more clearly perceived as a direct and significant 
source of profit and/or competitive advantage. At the 
same time, the variety of licensing practices has made 
it more difficult to identify a consensual approach to 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing 
(FRAND Licensing). Now, patent litigation has also 
significantly increased in highly competitive and fast-
moving areas such as the smartphone ecosystem. 
Nevertheless, their involvement in litigation has drawn 
much attention, fueling controversy on the 
interpretation and effectiveness of FRAND 
commitments in the current industry context.23 
In these circumstances, the seeking of injunctions 
can distort licensing negotiations and lead to unfair 
licensing terms, with a negative impact on consumer 
choice and prices. The ruling in Unwired Planet v 
Huawei26 provides an interesting analysis on two 
aspects of the licensing of SEPs as: legal nature of 
FRAND commitments and their enforceability under 
contract law; and the scope of the defences available 
under competition law. These commitments are mere 
contractual obligations and not statutory rules. 
Therefore, non-compliance with FRAND commitments 
can be addressed, for instance, as a breach of contract, 
under contract law, or in case of dominant firms, as an 
abuse of dominance under anti-trust law.27  
 
Enforcement of FRAND Terms under Contract Law 
The commitment made by holders of patents 
essential to a standard to license such patents on 
FRAND terms is now substantial. It is to be addressed 
as a question of economic theory: what limitations on 
the freedom of the parties negotiating a license to 
essential patents will best ensure efficient outcomes.28 
The dominant theory that several Courts in different 
jurisdictions have adopted to justify the enforcement 
of FRAND commitments is common law contract. 
Here, the patent holder makes a promise to a 
Standards-Development Organization (SDO) that it 
will license its essential patents to others on FRAND 
terms. The SDO accepts this promise as consideration 
for permitting the patent holder to participate in the 
relevant standardization effort. Hence, the common 
law elements of offer, acceptance and consideration 
are present.29 When a relevant standard is adopted and 
a vendor incorporates it into a product, the vendor can 
insist that the patent holder grant it a patent license on 
FRAND terms. Even if the vendor was not a member 
of the SDO, it can seek to enforce the patent holder’s 
promise as a third-party beneficiary.30  
However, common law contract is a poor fit for the 
enforcement of most FRAND commitments and 
relying too heavily on it is likely to have unwelcome 
results. It fails as a general-purpose FRAND 
enforcement theory on several grounds.29 As a result, 
except perhaps in a few cases in which standards are 
developed by small groups of firms that have actual 
contractual arrangements amongst themselves, 
common law contract is a poor choice as a general 
enforcement mechanism for FRAND commitments. 
International Trade Commission has come to the same 
conclusion in case against inter digital expressly 
ruling that the FRAND policy adopted by the 
European telecom SDO ETSI “is not a contract”, and 
merely “contains rules to guide the parties in their 
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interactions with the organization, other members and 
third parties.”31 It is argued that common law contract 
is useful, at most, in a small subset of these cases.29 
Legislative measures to address issues related to 
SEPs have also been discussed and explored during 
Thirteenth Session by the WIPO Standing Committee 
on the Law of Patents.32 The legislative measures are 
also required in absence of any strong enforceability 
within India for contractual violation by members of 
SSOs with respect to agreement of the members with 
the SSOs.33 Requirement of legislative measures has 
also been felt in cases which show uneven negotiating 
power of IP owner and potential licensor-especially in 
case of SEPs, where mutual contracts-especially with 
unreasonable terms of Non-Disclosure Agreement 
(NDA) may not be right tool for executing the 
licensing agreement. The advantages of these 
solutions are that they are universal, and also apply to 
non-participants in the standard-setting process.33 
 
Enforcement of FRAND Terms under Competition 
Law 
Besides common law contract, there are other 
theories for enforcing FRAND commitments. These 
include various anti-trust and competition law 
approaches, which have been advanced in different 
patent litigations so far. Standard setting is generally 
achieved by means of an agreement between 
undertakings, often competing in the same market.2 
Once a standard has been agreed and industry players 
have invested heavily in standard-compliant products, 
the market is de facto locked into both the standard 
and the relevant SEPs. It gives companies the 
potential to behave in anti-competitive way after 
adoption of the standard by excluding competitors 
from the market, extracting excessive royalty fee, 
setting cross-licence terms which the licensee would 
not otherwise agree to, or forcing the licensee to give 
up their invalidity or non-infringement claims against 
SEPs.2 To alleviate these competition concerns and to 
ensure that the benefits of standardization are 
promulgated, companies owning patents that are 
essential to implement a standard are required by 
many SSOs to commit to licensing their SEPs on 
FRAND terms. FRAND commitments are designed to 
ensure that the technology incorporated in a standard 
is accessible to the manufacturers of standard-
compliant products, and reward SEPs holders 
financially.2 
Following the grant of an injunction based on SEP 
by the Courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Motorola enforced the injunction in the German 
market in 2012. The enforcement led to a temporary 
ban on Apple’s online sales of iPhones and iPads to 
consumers in Germany. In addition, following the 
enforcement of the injunction, Apple was forced to 
enter into an onerous Settlement Agreement with 
Motorola whereby Apple had to give up its invalidity 
and non-infringement claims. This, in practical terms, 
may have forced Apple to pay for invalid and non-
infringed patents. Moreover, it is in the public interest 
that potentially invalid and non-infringed patents can 
be challenged in Court and that companies, and 
ultimately consumers, are not obliged to pay for 
patents that are not infringed.2 The European 
Commission (EC) outlined, that seeking injunctive 
relief before Courts is generally a legitimate remedy 
for holders of SEPs in case of patent infringements. 
However, depending on the particular circumstances 
in which the injunction is used, such use of an 
injunction based on an SEP may constitute an abuse 
of a dominant market position prohibited by Article 
10234 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).35 
 
Further, in January 2012, the EC commenced a 
formal investigation of Samsung to know whether the 
company violated Article 102 of TFEU. The 
investigation was based on allegations that Samsung 
had sought injunctions against a willing licensee, 
Apple, before the German, Italian, Dutch, UK, and 
French Courts, aimed at banning certain Apple 
products from the market on the basis of several 
Samsung 3G SEPs, which it had committed to license 
on FRAND terms. In December 2012, the EC issued 
its objection informing Samsung that its conduct 
amounted to an abuse of a dominant position, stating 
that when a potential licensee has shown itself to be 
willing to negotiate on FRAND terms, then recourse 
to an injunction harms competition by distorting 
licensing negotiations unduly in the SEP holder’s 
favour.36 
 
The EC’s Samsung and Motorola decisions have 
established that SEP holders will be liable for 
violating Article 102 for abusing their market power 
through hold-up by seeking injunctions against 
willing licensees. While the EC recognizes reverse 
hold-up concerns, it has concluded that such concerns 
do not arise when a potential licensee has explicitly 
agreed to enter into and be bound by a License 
Agreement at a FRAND royalty rate set by a Court or 
mutually agreed upon arbitrator. While the EC offered 
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examples of situations in which a SEP holder may 
appropriately seek and enforce injunctions on 
FRAND encumbered SEPs, the list of examples was 
non-exhaustive and thus leaves open the possibility of 
additional permissible situations.36 
 
FRAND Terms under Common Law Jurisdiction 
In Europe, the third generation (3G) mobile and 
wireless telecommunications standards were adopted 
in 1998. Samsung, among other many patent holders, 
committed irrevocably to the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to 
ensure access to its standardised technology by 
licensing standard-essential patents on FRAND unless 
there is an objective justification for not doing so. 
However, in 2011 Samsung sought injunctions in a 
number of Member States against competing mobile 
device makers alleging that they had infringed certain 
of its patent rights which it had identified as being 
essential to implement European mobile telephony 
standards. The question before Commission was 
whether Samsung has abused its dominant position 
and breached its commitment to the ETSI to license 
standard-essential patents of its Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication Service (UMTS) on FRAND 
terms by seeking injunctions against competing 
mobile device makers in a number of Member 
States.37 
Joaquín Almunia recognised that standards-setting 
plays a crucial role in promoting interoperability, 
interconnection and seamless communication in 
relation to communication technologies. The author 
recognised the pro-competitive benefits of 
standardisation agreements which encourage the 
development of new and improved products or 
markets; improve the conditions of supply; maintain 
and enhance quality; and ensure interoperability and 
compatibility. As a result, they increase competition 
and reduce output and sales costs.38 Standardisation 
agreements can however be anti-competitive where 
they create ‘market power’39. They may also lead to 
the restriction of price competition, the limitation or 
control of production, markets, innovation or 
technical development. This can occur where there is 
a reduction in price competition, foreclosure of 
innovative technologies and exclusion of, or 
discrimination against, certain companies by 
prevention of effective access to the standard.37 The 
Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines40 identify the 
following practices to ensure that the agreements fall 
outside the scope of the competition rules: 
a) Participation in standard-setting must be 
unrestricted; 
b) Need of transparent procedures for adopting the 
particular standard; 
c) There must not be any obligation to comply with the 
standard; and 
d) Access to the standard should be on fair reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms. 
 
Joaquín Almunia further writes that once a 
company’s patents are incorporated into essential 
standards, the Commission is clear that the patent 
holder should not be allowed to exploit this increased 
market power either by charging excessive royalties for 
use of those patents; or by foreclosing competitors 
from access to the essential standard patents through 
other means. To this end, companies must give 
effective access to their essential patents on FRAND 
terms.41 
The industry is keen to see whether the Commission 
will use the Samsung investigation as an opportunity to 
explain its interpretation of what is fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory. In addition, compliance by SSOs 
with the Article 10142 of TFEU does not require them 
to verify whether the licensing terms of participants 
fulfil the FRAND commitment.43 In order to ensure the 
transparent and consistent licensing of patents on 
FRAND terms, Apple suggested the framework should 
be based on three elements: appropriate royalty rate, 
common royalty base and no injunction.44 Apple also 
suggested that a patent holder should apply its 
appropriate rate to a common royalty base which 
should be no higher than the industry average sales 
price for a basic communications device that is capable 
of both voice and data communication. 
In Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v ZTE Corp. and 
ZTE Deutschland GmbH45 the issue was whether 
Huawei had abused its dominance by requesting that 
ZTE stop using its patent. While it is legitimate for a 
patent holder to seek an injunction against the 
unlicensed use of its patents, the situation is different 
when SEPs are at stake. The reasons for this lie in the 
essential nature of SEPs and the way they are granted. 
It was concerned with European patent that is essential 
for the long-term evolution standard, a standard for 
wireless high-speed data communication for mobile 
phones and data terminals. ETSI had awarded Huawei 
SEP status for its patent in return for Huawei’s promise 
to grant licences on FRAND terms. ZTE, a 
manufacturer of base stations that comply with the 
long-term evolution standard, used the SEP without 
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paying royalties to Huawei. The two companies 
attempted to negotiate a licensing agreement on 
FRAND terms but were unsuccessful. In 2013, Huawei 
brought an injunctive action against ZTE for its 
continued use of the patent before the Düsseldorf 
Regional Court in Germany. ZTE argued that because 
it was ready and willing to negotiate, asking for 
injunctive relief constituted an abuse of dominance by 
Huawei in violation of Article 10246 of TFEU. The 
Regional Court found that the German Federal Court of 
Justice and the European Commission appeared to 
have taken inconsistent approaches in determining at 
what point the holder of an SEP violates Article 102 by 
bringing an action for a prohibitory injunction.  
 
The Federal Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Orange Book Standard47placed significant obligations 
on an alleged infringer, while the SEP holder could 
immediately file an action for a prohibitory 
injunction. It was up to the alleged infringer to make 
an unconditional offer to conclude a licensing 
agreement pursuant to FRAND terms.47 The European 
Commission, on the other hand, in the Samsung21 and 
Motorola22 cases, effectively established the principle 
that the holder of an SEP has no right to obtain an 
injunction under Article 102, if the alleged infringer 
has shown itself to be a willing licensee.48 On 5 April 
2013, the Düsseldorf Regional Court stayed the 
proceedings and asked the ECJ to clarify under what 
circumstances the holder of an SEP who is seeking an 
injunction against an entity that uses this SEP abuses 
its dominant position in violation of such Article. The 
ECJ emphasised the fact that SEP status is awarded 
only in exchange for the patent holder’s irrevocable 
promise to grant licences on FRAND terms.  
 
This creates a legitimate expectation for third parties 
that such licences will in fact be granted, and it means 
that a refusal to do so may constitute an abuse of 
dominance within the meaning of such Article. The 
ECJ further found that the owner of an SEP is more 
likely than the alleged infringer to be aware of its SEP 
being used for a specific standard, and better positioned 
to draft the terms of a FRAND compliant licensing 
agreement. The ECJ thus held that a dominant SEP 
holder who promised to license on FRAND terms and 
seeks injunctive relief or the recall of products abuses 
its dominant market position if it fails to approach the 
alleged infringer in order to reach a licensing 
agreement.49 The ECJ stipulated obligations of the 
alleged infringer as in order to avoid an injunction, the 
alleged infringer does not need to accept the SEP 
holder’s licensing offer. It must, however, respond 
diligently to that offer, which is specified as in 
accordance with recognized commercial practices in 
the field and in good faith, and in particular without 
delaying tactics; if it rejects the offer, promptly make a 
written and specific counter-offer based on FRAND 
terms; and if the proprietor rejects the counter-offer and 
the alleged infringer still uses the SEP, provide 
adequate security in accordance with recognized 
commercial practices in the field. The parties to the 
dispute may also agree to ask an independent third 
party to determine the amount of the royalty for them. 
Finally, the ECJ pointed out that an alleged infringer 
does not violate any of its obligations towards the SEP 
holder if it challenges the validity and/or essential 
nature of these patents during the licensing 
negotiations.49 
The above ruling provides important guidelines for 
the assessment of the duties of SEP holders and alleged 
infringers of their patents. This lets patent holders 
apply for injunctive relief without having to defend the 
validity of their patents at the same time. The ECJ has 
now stated that it is up to the SEP holder, not the 
alleged infringer, to alert the other party and to make 
the first offer. The consequences of this decision for 
future patent litigators may thus be significant. 
 
Status of FRAND Jurisprudence for SEPs in India 
J. Gregory Sidak argues that although India has the 
world’s second-largest telecommunications network, 
Indian jurisprudence on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms for licensing standard-
essential patents (SEPs) is at a nascent stage.50 However, 
on the other hand in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v 
Mercury Elecs. & Another51 the Delhi High Court passed 
interim orders in two patent-infringement cases 
concerning FRAND licensing and the Competition 
Commission of India (CCI) is simultaneously addressed 
complaints filed in India concerning FRAND 
licensing.52 Although the CCI has passed orders 
addressing both complaints, it has not reached a final 
decision in any case.50 The interim order passed by the 
High Court of Delhi is now considered as evolving of 
FRAND Jurisprudence in the country. The following 
part of the paper focuses on proceedings before these 
two authorities.  
 
Brief of the Proceedings before the Competition 
Commission of India 
In Micromax Informatics Ltd. v 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,53 Micromax 
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Informatics Limited filed a complaint before CCI and 
alleged that Ericsson abused its allegedly dominant 
position by imposing exorbitant royalties for the use 
of its SEPs. It further argued that using the sales price 
of the downstream product, as the royalty base 
constitutes misuse of SEPs that would ultimately 
harm consumers. The CCI in its preliminary order 
stated that, in the relevant product market, Ericsson 
was in a dominant position in the market for devices 
that implement such standards. The commission 
observed that patent hold-up undermines the 
competitive process of choosing among technologies 
and thus threatens the integrity of Standard Setting 
activities. It also said that Ericsson’s royalty rates 
were excessive and discriminatory, given that they 
were set as a percentage of the price of downstream 
products instead of as a percentage of the price of the 
GSM or CDMA chip. The Commission concluded 
that the requested royalties had no linkage to the 
patented product and were thus discriminatory as well 
as contrary to FRAND terms. Ericsson challenged the 
order of the Commission in High Court of Delhi.54 
 
In Intex Techs. (India) Ltd. v Telefonaktiebolaget 
LM Ericsson55 the commission held that a refusal to 
share the commercial terms of the FRAND license 
may lead to discriminatory commercial terms. It also 
said that charging different licensing fees for the use 
of the same technology from different users is against 
FRAND terms and imposing a jurisdiction clause of 
the agreement that prevented Intex Tech. (India) Ltd. 
from adjudicating its disputes in a country where both 
parties were in business also provided prima facie 
evidence of an abuse of a dominant position. The 
commission was of opinion that Ericsson had abused 
its dominant position ordered that the Director 
General to combine the investigation with the claims 
that Micromax and Intex had brought against 
Ericsson. 
 
The Commission has brought two public 
investigations involving SEPs, both against Ericsson 
and both based upon allegations that the company 
violated its FRAND commitments by imposing 
discriminatory and excessive royalty rates and using 
Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). According to the 
Commission, forcing a party to execute NDA and 
imposing excessive and unfair royalty rates is 
primafacie abuse of dominance as imposing a 
jurisdiction clause debarring complainant from getting 
disputes adjudicated in the country where both parties 
were in business. In both matters, the Commission 
stated that prima facie the relevant product market is 
the provision of SEP for 2G, 3G and 4G technologies 
in GSM standard compliant mobile communication 
devices, in India, in which prima facie it is apparent 
that Ericsson was dominant.56 
In the case of Best IT World (India) Private Ltd. v 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson57 Best IT World 
(India) Private Ltd executed a Patent Licensing 
Agreement and Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) to 
license the use of Ericsson’s patents in GSM and 
WCDMA compliant product. iBall alleged that 
Ericsson’s conduct violates Section 4 of the 
Competition Act, 2002.58 Similar to its orders in 
Micromax and Intex, the Commission observed that, 
because there is no alternate technology available for 
Ericsson’s patents in the 2G, 3G, and 4G standards, 
Ericsson enjoys a complete dominance over its 
present and prospective licensees in the relevant 
market. The practice of forcing a party to execute 
NDA and imposing excessive and unfair royalty rates, 
prima facie, amount to abuse of dominance in 
violation of Section 4 of the Act.59 Ericson filed an 
appeal against the order of the Commission the High 
Court of Delhi. 
 
Brief of the Proceeding before the High Court of 
Delhi 
The High Court of Delhi has now dealt with issues 
pertaining to SEPs and their availability on FRAND 
terms in cases filed by Telefonaktiebolaget LM 
Ericsson against Micromax and other companies 
alleging infringement of its patents that were essential 
to the 2G and 3G standards.60 The Court in these 
cases relied on the comparable licenses to determine a 
FRAND royalty. The Court used the net sales price of 
the downstream device as a royalty base in calculating 
amount of royalty. The Delhi High Court decision to 
use the value of the downstream product as a royalty 
base and rely on comparable licenses to determine a 
FRAND royalty was consistent with sound economic 
principles, and also indicated that the Court was 
responding to the judicial and industry trends in the 
rest of the world.50 In addition to the patent 
infringement suits, Ericsson also filed appeal against 
various orders passed by the Competition commission 
of India wherein it directed investigation by Director 
General. The High Court of Delhi has granted stay on 
all such orders passed by the Commission in different 
cases.61 
In Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Xiaomi 
Technology & Others,62 the temporary injunction 
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granted against Xiaomi in December 2014 for patent 
infringement and for refusing to enter into a licensing 
agreement with Ericsson was lifted by the Delhi High 
Court for two 3G standard essential patents on the 
ground of concealment of information by Ericsson.  
 
Qualcomm Inc and Ericsson AG signed a global 
patent licensing agreement that allowed Qualcomm to 
utilize the patented technology in producing chipsets, 
which were sold to several device manufacturers 
around the world, including Xiaomi. Since its entry 
into the Indian market in July 2014, Xiaomi has sold 
cell phones incorporating Ericsson’s patented 
technology. Before launching its phones in India, 
Xiaomi was asked by Ericsson to obtain the necessary 
licences to use Ericsson’s patented technology. 
However, it opted instead to purchase a licence to use 
Ericsson’s patents directly from Qualcomm. The SEP 
holder filed a patent infringement action against 
Xiaomi before the Delhi High Court, alleging that it 
had started using Ericsson’s patented technology 
without a licence, ignoring Ericsson’s offer to license 
the suit patents on FRAND terms. Ericsson reported 
that it had asked Xiaomi to obtain a patent licence to 
distribute products in India well before the company 
entered the Indian cell phone market but failed to 
report to the trial judge that Xiaomi was already 
paying royalties for licensing the same patents from 
Qualcomm. 
 
Further, Ericsson stated that, even though Xiaomi 
was aware of Ericsson’s portfolio of SEPs and 
Ericsson’s willingness to offer a licence, it had 
refused to acknowledge their position until the Court 
issued an ex parte interim order restraining Xiaomi 
from a range of actions, including ‘manufacturing, 
assembling, importing, selling, offering for sale or 
advertising, including their and third party, websites, 
products that used Ericsson’s patented technology. It 
was observed by the Court that Courts in India are 
empowered to grant injunctions and stop importation 
or distribution of infringing products that contain 
patented technologies, unless accompanied by the 
required permission. Xiaomi filed an appeal against 
the injunction on the ground of concealment of 
material facts by Ericsson. It alleged that Ericsson had 
not informed the judge who issued the ex parte order 
of the fact that Xiaomi had rightfully purchased a 
licence from Qualcomm and, therefore, was not 
infringing Ericsson’s patents. In order to strike ‘a 
balance between the right of the appellants’, the 
interim order allowed Xiaomi to distribute its 
products, provided the company deposits to the Court 
amount equivalent to three months’ sales; provide 
information about the presence of chipsets purchased 
from Qualcomm that incorporated Ericsson’s patents; 
report all invoices to the Court; and added a further 
deposit according to sales for the month of January in 
2015. As per the guidelines set by the Court, Xiaomi 
was able to continue to sell the allegedly infringing 
products in India, pending final resolution.  
The final order was delivered in favour of Xiaomi 
on the grounds of concealment. The order was 
applicable only to the chipsets that were licensed by 
Xiaomi from Qualcomm, which concerned only two 
of the original eight suit patents. The Court found that 
Ericsson had deliberately and materially concealed 
the evidence of a licensing agreement with 
Qualcomm. The Court observed that, the party 
seeking an ex parte order has a heightened duty to 
disclose all the material information relevant for the 
purpose of the injunction sought, a duty that Ericsson 
had failed to perform. The use of chipsets from 
Qualcomm was held as an authorized use of the 
patents, since Qualcomm was paying royalties to 
Ericsson. The Court ruled that Ericsson had 
deliberately concealed the licensing agreement, to the 
point that they had acted mala fide and approached 
this Court with unclean hands.  
This ruling is important for the establishment, 
enforcement and maintenance of patent rights in 
India. Amidst the on-going litigations concerning 
telecom SEPs, it throws light on the conduct of both 
licensor and licensee in the context of a patent 
licensing agreement. The decision is a welcome 
change in light of other similar cases where courts 
appeared to have considered the issuing of an 
injunction as the norm, rather than an exception. 
Further, it draws attention on the need to carry out a 
thorough assessment of the conduct of the parties on a 
case-by-case basis. This decision will go a long way 
towards ensuring that the conduct of the licensing 
parties is investigated and adequately dealt with for 
the benefit of SEP holders, technology 
implementers/manufacturers, and end users.63 
 
Conclusion 
The dream of Digital India may only be fulfilled if 
Indian Government adopts a policy which promotes 
appropriate use of technology. The problem of 
compatibility of technologies will always be a 
difficult issue and the governmental policy needs to 
deal with such issues in an effective manner. There is 
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fair amount of controversy over commitments that 
patent holder licenses its SEPs on terms that are 
FRAND. Adoption of certain technologies as standard 
is often beneficial for both the patent holder and the 
market. The precedent set by antitrust decisions 
provides a path to patent peace in the 
telecommunications industry.2 In India, the recent 
trend of litigation seems conflicting as one party 
wishes to enforce FRAND term and opposite party is 
arguing that the terms are anti-competitive. The 
existing legal framework in India, including the rules 
presiding the grant of injunctions and the licensing of 
SEPs on strictly FRAND terms, appears to be 
adequate to protect the interest of all stakeholders. In 
relation to the view that changes to FRAND licensing 
is required to respond to future problems, market 
suggests caution prior to disrupting the carefully 
balanced FRAND ecosystem.56 The Discussion Paper 
states that FRAND commitments ensure that the 
holder of SEPs should not abuse the dominant market 
position. However, experience has shown that 
FRAND standards are sometimes ineffectual in 
preventing hold-ups because they are intentionally 
vague and create anti-competitive results by 
concealing from the standard-setting process the 
actual cost of incorporating a patented feature into a 
standard.64 In such a situation, India needs to adopt 
such a policy which suits the interest of all the 
stakeholders. 
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